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Abstract
This Essay is an attempt to make sense of the author’s experiences working with legal reform
in Eritrea. Specifically, what might drive people who are intelligent and informed to create statutes
that: (a) probably will not work (the problem of “legal absorption” or ”legal transplants”); or (b)
if applied will have adverse consequences. In this Essay, the author: Gives a brief introduction on
Eritrea; uses an Eritrean intellectual property example to illustrate why countries adopt laws that
seem opposed to their interests; gives a brief history of Africa and the transplantation of Western
law; gives a brief history of Tax Law in sub-Saharan Africa; moves to a specific Eritrean example
and show why we would expect Eritrea to avoid some of the problems; gives examples of how
Eritrea has failed to avoid problems confronted by other sub-Saharan African States; and finally
presents a possible explanation for the Eritrean drive toward Western legal models.
ESSAY
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay is an attempt to make sense of my experiences
working with legal reform in Eritrea. Specifically, I try to under-
stand what might drive people who are intelligent and informed
to create statutes that:
(a) probably will not work-in the sense that the rules as
written will not be applied (the problem of "legal ab-
sorption" or "legal transplants"); or
(b) if applied-will have adverse consequences.
In this sense, the Essay moves away from the question of why
Western law fails to thrive in foreign soil and toward an earlier
point in the law making process. In other words, my question is:
What makes Western law attractive to non-Western law makers in
the first place given the long history of legal transplants and
their failures?1
My main concern in asking these questions is the law of tax-
ation. But, as illustration, I begin with an intellectual property
example because it more easily sets the stage for understanding
the problem-particularly for people without tax backgrounds.
In this Essay, I:
* Voss Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Thanks to
David Brennen, Luca Castellani, Richard Delgado, Ruth Gordon, Mengsteab Negash,
Leon Trakman, and Adrien Wing for their comments on earlier versions of this Essay.
Thanks also to Jacqueline Fontana for her unbelievably thorough and helpful research
assistance. Copyright for this Essay is shared by Fordham International Law Journal and
Beverly Moran.
1. See generally, ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAw 35, 73-87, 100-01 (2d ed. 1993); Rodolfo Sacco, LegalFormants: A Dynamic Approach
to Comparative Law (Installment II of I), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 398-400 (1991) ("The
borrowing of legal rules and institutions often gives rise to strange and artificial ratio-
nalizations"); Jeswald Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing
Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L LAw. 875, 883 (1999).
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" Give a brief introduction on Eritrea;
* Use an Eritrean intellectual property example to illustrate
why countries adopt laws that seem opposed to their in-
terests (the pre-absorption question);
" Give a brief history of Africa and the transplantation of
Western law in order to provide an historical framework;
* Give a brief history of Tax Law in sub-Saharan Africa in
order to show that governments suffer more when tax
laws fail than when other laws fail;
* Move to a specific Eritrean example and show why we
would expect Eritrea to avoid some of the problems that
have plagued other African countries' law reform;
* Give examples of how Eritrea has failed to avoid problems
confronted by other sub-Saharan African States; and fi-
nally,
" Present a possible explanation for the Eritrean drive to-
ward Western legal models.
I. ERITREA: AN INTRODUCTION
Eritrea is an East African nation located on the southern
Red Sea. Across the Red Sea to its east lies Yemen, with Saudi
Arabia to the northeast. On the west Eritrea borders the Sudan;
on the southeast it borders Djibouti; and to the south, lies Ethio-
pia.2
Eritrea has two distinct regions: a highlands traditionally
dominated by Christians-particularly Christians from the
Tigrinya-speaking ethnic group-and a Muslim lowlands where
all nine of its major ethnic groups reside.
Eritrea received its independence in May 1991 after a thirty-
year war waged against the Ethiopian regime of the Emperor
Haile Selassie and the socialist government that followed the
Emperor, which was known as the "Derg."3
There has been some relationship between Eritrea and Ethi-
opia since biblical times. The nature of that relationship is sub-
ject to tremendous dispute, especially given the recent Eritrean
war against the Derg and the present Eritrean conflict with the
new Ethiopia. Rather than enter into those disagreements, I
2. Figure 1 shows the geographic location of Eritrea. See Eritrea, http://www.state.
gov/p/af/ci/er.
3. Amharic for "committee."
2001] HOMOGENIZED LAW
Fig. 1
SAUD
SUDAN "'AR.ABIA
Na'la. 5 ea,
Ak'ordat* Massawa E
shall give a short (and I hope uncontroversial) history of Eritrea,
which necessitates some reference to Ethiopia.4
During the first thousand years of the Christian era, Eritrea
was part of the Aksumite Kingdom. Aksum was a powerful trad-
ing nation that maintained relations with the Eastern and West-
ern Roman Empires, Egypt, and various Arab kingdoms.5
4. The history of both Ethiopia and Eritrea is very controversial and quite frankly,
is beyond the scope of this article. The history I present is intended to provide back-
ground information for the purpose of a tax discussion. Sources that focus on the
history of these two countries are numerous. For the interested reader, see generally
ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION (Amare Tekle ed., 1994); ETHI-
OPIA AND ERITREA: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY (Habtu Ghebre-Ab ed., 1993); THE LONG
STRUGGLE OF ERITREA FOR INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE (Lionel Cliffe &
Basil Davidson eds., 1988); HAROLD G. MARCUS, A HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA (1994); RICH-
ARD PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA 1800-1935 (1968) [hereinafter PANK-
HURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA]; MARGERY PERHAM, THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHI-
OPIA (1969); 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ETHIO-
PIAN STUDIES 1-373 (Bahru Zewde et al. eds., 1994); BAHRU ZEWDE, A SHORT HISTORY OF
ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN (1998).
5. See RICHARD PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA EARLY TIMES TO 1800,
at 16-24, 36-39 (1961) [hereinafter PANKHURST, EARLY TIMES]; Semere Haile, Historical
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Christianity arrived in Eritrea in the 4th century A.D. and
has remained strong in the highlands to the present day.6 Islam
penetrated the lowlands sometime later where it continues to
flourish.7 Starting in the 1400s, parts of what are now the Eri-
trean lowlands were dominated by various Muslim rulers includ-
ing the Adal Sultanate (15th-19th century A.D.), the Aussa Sul-
tanate (16th-19th century), the Egyptians (18th century), and
the Ottoman Turks (16th-19th centuries).8
In the 14th century, Eritrea was recognized by Abyssinia as a
vassal state. 9 The Abyssinian Empire was made up of a series of
provinces that were ruled by kings who were supported by circles
of under lords and peasants.' ° These kings were inconsistent in
their abilities and resources. Accordingly, in each generation,
one king would rise above his peers to the position of Em-
peror."'
By the early 1800s, Ethiopia was a diminished Empire. In
contrast to the Middle Ages, 19th century Ethiopia began with
weak emperors surrounded by strong kings.12 Within this sys-
tem, much of present-day Eritrea was included in the most im-
portant Ethiopian province, Tigray.'3 The present Eritrean
Christian highlands were controlled by Ras Walda Selassie, 4
while the present Eritrean Muslim lowlands were in the hands of
a semi-autonomous chief (the "Naib of Arkiko") who ruled sub-
ject to the Ottoman Empire. 5
In Tigray, Ras Walda Selassie was followed by Dajazmach
Wube (1839-1855) and Ras Kassa who later became Emperor
Yohannes (1872-1889).16 During this period, the Ottoman
Turks usually controlled the Red Sea while the Eritrean port city
Background to the Eitrea Conflict, in THE LONG STRUGGLE OF ERITREA FOR INDEPENDENCE
AND CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE 11-12 (Lionel Cliffe & Basil Davidson eds., 1988).
6. See Haile, supra note 5, at 12.
7. See id.
8. See PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 61, 65-66, 74-
80, 105-06, 110; PERHAM, supra note 4, at 13, 36-37.
9. See PERHAM, supra note 4, at 12-13.
10. See ZEWDE, supra note 4, at 60; MARCUS, supra note 4, at 28.
11. See MARCUS, supra note 4, at 30-47; Haile, supra note 5, at 16.
12. See MARCUS, supra note 4, at 48-49; Haile, supra note 5, at 16.
13. See PERHAM, supra note 4, at 16.
14. See Haile, supra note 5, at 15.
15. See id. at 14-15; PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at
529.
16. See PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 2-19.
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Massawa passed between Ethiopian, Turkish, British, and Italian
control. 17
Assab, now an important Eritrean port, was purchased by an
Italian firm in 1869, and was declared an Italian colony in
1882.18 This was followed by the Italian occupation of Masawa in
1885.19 Eritrea was established as an Italian colony in 1889.20
The Italian occupation of Eritrea lasted until World War II
when Eritrea fell into British hands from 1941-1950.21 In 1950,
the United Nations turned Eritrea over to Ethiopia.22 Although
the arrangement began as a federation, the Emperor Haile Se-
lassie incorporated Eritrea into Ethiopia in 1962.23 This led to
the resistance struggle, which continued through the Derg until
independence was achieved in 1993.24
II. THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL ABSORPTION-AN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXAMPLE
A. Eritrean Commercial Law-Where Does It Come From?
Eritrea currently operates under the Ethiopian Commercial
Code. The Ethiopian Commercial Code was adopted in 1960.25
The Code was commissioned by Emperor Haile Selassie who en-
gaged French lawyers to write his Civil and Commercial Codes.2 6
As a result, the Ethiopian Commercial Code is based on the
French Commercial Code existing in the mid-20th century as in-
terpreted by French courts of that period. From its adoption in
1960 to date, there have been few, if any, changes in the Ethio-
17. See id.; Haile, supra note 5, at 14-15.
18. See PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 17.
19. See id. at 18, 166.
20. See id. at 19; Haile, supra note 5, at 14-16.
21. See PERHAM, supra note 4, at 484.
22. See id. at xxi, 499, 502.
23. See id. at xxxiii.
24. See LucA G. CASTELLANI, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAND TENURE LAW IN ERI-
TREA, HORN OF AFRICA 1 (Land Tenure Center, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, Work-
ing Paper No. 37, 2000); see also Mengesteab Negash, Investment Laws in Eritrea, 24 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 313, 314-15 (1999). Eritreans began the armed struggle against
Ethiopia in September 1961, and defeated the Ethiopian army in May 1991. Id. Eritre-
ans formally declared independence in May 1993. Id.
25. See BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS OF THE ETHIOPIAN COMMERCIAL CODE OF 1960, at
iv, 37 (Peter Winship ed., 1974).
26. Professor Ren6 David drafted the Civil Code and Professor Jean Escarra
drafted the Commercial Code. See id. at 164 n.1.
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pian Commercial Code.27
Because of its age, the Eritrean Commercial Code lacks cer-
tain provisions that appear in later Western codes. Specifically,
for our example, the Eritrean Commercial Code lacks rules con-
cerning the protection of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
These intangible property rights that are so important in West-
ern law are referred to collectively as "good will" in the Eritrean
Commercial Code.28
Currently Eritrean legal reform emphasizes the need to ex-
pand protections for "good will" in the Revised Eritrean Com-
mercial Code, which is essentially a revision of the 1960 Ethio-
pian Code.
B. Problems with Revisions to Protect "Good Will" in the Eritrean
Commercial Code
There are two problems with the expansion of protections
for "good will" in the Eritrean Commercial Code. One problem
has to do with a strong Eritrean interest in economic develop-
ment. The second problem has to do with the Eritrean lack of
legal resources.
1. The Economic Development Problem
In order to understand the economic development problem
associated with "good will," I ask you to engage in a thought ex-
periment. Name an American or a Japanese brand name. You
should be able to name a dozen without a moment's thought.
Now, try to name: an Indonesian, a Malaysian, a Sin-
gaporean, or a Hong Kong brand. I suspect that there was not a
single brand you could name unless you have lived in these
countries.
The purpose of this experiment is to illustrate that "good
will" is not equally distributed across all economies. Instead,
"good will" is primarily a property right that resides in the most
developed ("OECD") nations. Not only do lesser developed
countries ("LDCs") lack the property rights known as "good
27. For the Ethiopian Commercial Code, see COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD,
ETHIOPIA 1 (Foreign Tax Law Publishers, rev. Nov. 1997).
28. See ErH. COMM. C. ch. 2, § 1, arts. 100, 127, 130. Article 100 discusses the
consistency of a business. See id. art. 100. Article 127 discusses good will and incorpo-
real elements. See id. art. 127. Article 130 defines "good will." See id. art. 130.
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will," the protection of "good will" is not in the interest of lesser
developed countries.
To understand how important this concept is, let us reflect
on the history of economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.
Every African country entered into its post-colonial era searching
for a way to achieve rapid development.
29
In the 1960s and 1970s, the economic development model
for sub-Saharan Africa was the Soviet Union ("USSR") and the
People's Republic of China ("PRC") .30 There were many rea-
sons for these countries' attractiveness to emerging sub-Saharan
States. The USSR's rapid expansion after its total devastation
during World War II and the PRC's own colonial past and eco-
nomic success were just two aspects of that attraction."'
In addition to the economic miracle represented by the
USSR and PRC, Socialist law and politics were attractive to Afri-
cans because Socialist philosophy legitimizes African political
trends as reflected in many sub-Saharan African countries both
inside and outside the socialist sphere.3 2 These political trends
include single party States, military rule, a subordinate judiciary
and legal system, and government control of natural resources.3 3
Further, neither the USSR nor PRC had an African colonial
history. They were, therefore, less hated by African elites. 34 In
29. See Goran Hyden, Development: Trends and Issues, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA
SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 424, 425 (John Middleton ed., 1997).
30. See MICHAEL HODD, THE ECONOMIES OF AFRICA 34-35 (1991).
31. See id.; see also Salacuse, supra note 1, at 883.
32. See Samir Amin, Neocolonialism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA SOUTH OF THE
SAHARA 286, 290-91 (John Middleton ed., 1997); RobertJ. Berg, Development: Models of
Social and Economic Development, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 429-
30 (John Middleton ed., 1997); HODD, supra note 30, at 34-35; E. Wayne Nafziger, Ex-
change and Market Systems: National and Regional Systems, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA
SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 110 (John Middleton ed., 1997).
33. See Amin, supra note 32, at 290; Berg, supra note 32, at 430; William J. Foltz,
Military Government and Armies, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 156-
57 Uohn Middleton ed., 1997); Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 355-56 (John Middleton ed., 1997). These characteristics
are part of many contemporary African States whether socialist or not. These political
aspects of the State allow one ethnic group to control and dominate another. See id.
This pattern of ethnic domination is a common bond between African political systems
and Socialist States. See id.
34. See GEORGE B.N. AvrrmE, THE END OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM? 3 (The Heritage
Lectures No. 250, 1990) [hereinafter AvrrrEv, END OF SOCIALISM]; Amin, supra note 32,
at 286, 290-91; HODD, supra note 30, at 34; see alsoJeffrey Sachs, Growth in Africa: It Can
Be Done, ECONOMIST, June 29, 1996, at 19-20 (explaining that African nations were skep-
tical of free trade because of years of colonization by open-market countries).
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addition, during the Cold War, the ability to play Western States
against Communist States was a way to increase foreign aid.35 Fi-
nally, American development experts, the European Economic
Community, and the World Bank copied Soviet models, favoring
single-party and strong state intervention as a means to develop-
ment.
3 6
In the 1980s and 1990s, the economic development model
for sub-Saharan Africa shifted from the USSR and the PRC to-
ward East and Southeast Asia.3 7 That shift is not surprising when
we consider that, in the 1960s, Ghana and Singapore were con-
sidered on the same economic level.38 Yet, today, no one calls
Singapore a Third World nation while Ghana and the rest of
Africa remain behind the development curve. However, just as
the African interest in the USSR and PRC had more to it than
economic development, so does the African attraction to emerg-
ing Asia. Although the Asian economic miracle is one major rea-
son for the African attraction towards the mid-level Asian states,
similar political structures make the Asian states attractive as
well. 9
So how did the Indonesians, Malaysians and Singaporeans
achieve their economic development? In part, by stealing West-
ern "good will."40 By producing "knock-off" Calvin Klein jeans
35. See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding, and Serv-
ing Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 174 (1997).
36. See GEORGE B.N. AYTTEY, AFRICA IN CHAOS 269-71 (1998) [hereinafter AvITTEY,
AFRICA IN CHAOS]; AyiTTEY, END OF SOCIALISM, supra note 34, at 2; Amin, supra note 32,
at 290. It was believed that democracy and free enterprise would be injected into the
system once the economies of these African countries were solidified. See id. Ruth
Gordon stated, "[plostcolonial institutions were prescribed on top of the still-existing
coercive and anti-democratic structures of the colonial era." Ruth Gordon, Growing
Constitutions, I U. PA.J. CONST. L. 528, 532 (1999) [hereinafter Gordon, Growing Consti-
tutions].
37. See David L. Lindauer & Michael Roemer, Legacies and Opportunities, in ASIA
AND AFRICA: LEGACIES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN DEVELOPMENT 1, 5-6, 23 n.5 (David L. Lin-
dauer & Michael Roemer eds., 1994); see also Salacuse, supra note 1, at 882-83.
38. See Kenneth M. Kauffman & Helena Stalson, U.S. Assistance to Less Developed
Countries, 1956-65, 45 FOREIGN AFF. 715, 716 (1967) (categorizing Ghana and Singapore
as "Less Developed Countries").
39. Singapore, for example, although clearly not socialist, mirrors many of the po-
litical features of African States, e.g., single party politics, military dominance, and a
subordinate judiciary. See 2 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SINGA-
PORE: A COUNTRY STUDY 184-85, 192-93, 197-98, 237 (Louis R. Mortimer ed., 1991).
40. See generally, David Holley, South Korea's Counterfeiters Make It Hard to Knock Off
Knockoffs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at D1; Carol Pucci, Sell, Sell: Bye-Bye-Hong Kong, the
Capital of Capital, Is on the Brink of Political Transition, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at KI;
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and Rolex watches, Asia moved ahead while Africa stayed be-
hind.
Obviously, the theft of "good will" is not the whole explana-
tion for Asia's economic advancement. Yet, to the extent that
the story of Asia's development reveals anything, it certainly ar-
gues against protecting other countries' "good will."
2. Limited Legal Resources
Eritrea is like most LDCs in at least two respects: it has lim-
ited legal resources and it has a great interest in economic devel-
opment. Having discussed why Eritrea's economic development
argues against the protection of "good will," let us now turn to
why limited legal resources argue against the protection of
"good will" in the Eritrean Commercial Code.
Apart from symbolic impact, law is useless without enforce-
ment-whether by the State or by social convention.41 Enforce-
ment creates problems of interpretation because government
workers and others involved in the State-run legal system must
know what to enforce.4 2 Both enforcement and interpretation
require legal resources. Yet, most LDCs have very few legal re-
sources.
Eritrea is particularly vulnerable in this regard. Eritrea has
no more than 100 lawyers and almost no paralegal workers. 3
Based on a population of over 3,000,000, even ajapanese model
would predict approximately 500 lawyers in that country plus a
wide variety of other legal professionals." Accordingly, Eritrea
Nick B. Williams, Jr., Thai Producers Grapple with Growing Piracy: Protection Issue Simmers
As Moral, Economic Dilemma, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1988, § 4, at 2.
41. SeeJoseph R. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations
of Deviance, in READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAw 509, 510-12 (Stewart Macaulay et
al. eds., 1995).
42. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Directing Legal Change and Its Impact, 2 APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. ANN. 139, 142-45 (Leonard Bickman ed., 1981); Doreen McBarnet, Law,
Policy, and Legal Avoidance: Can Law Effectively Implement Egalitarian Policies?, 15 J.L. &
Soc'y 113, 113-14 (1988); Doreen McBarnet, Whiter Than White Collar Crime: Tax, Fraud
Insurance and the Management of Stigma, 42 BRIT. J. Soc. 323, 323-24 (1991).
43. See Negash, supra note 24, at 375-76.
44. See Toshimitsu Takaesu, Japan's Legal System's More Than the Sum of U.S. Lawyers,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 24, 1994, at B5 (stating that the number of official lawyers in Japan
is approximately 16,000 to serve a population of 125,000,000). However, in Japan, non-
lawyers perform much of the work performed by lawyers in the United States. See id.;
Neil Boyden Tanner, The Failure of International Law to Internationalize the Legal Profession,
17J.L. & COM. 131, 134-38 (1997).
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has little hope of enforcing any law, much less a law that works
against its economic interests.
When a country has so few legal resources, it should be ex-
tremely careful about how those resources are spent, particularly
if these resources are used to protect another country's property
rights. Yet, there is no doubt that the Eritrean Commercial
Code will give greater protections to "good will."
III. HISTORY OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND ITS ADOPTION
OF WESTERN LAW
The answer to why countries make legal choices must come,
at least in part, from legal context, that is, the interaction of his-
tory and culture with legal rules.45
The Eritrean legal context is part of the larger African con-
text. Accordingly, this part of the Essay gives some very basic
background into the forces that helped shape modern law re-
form in Eritrea in particular and in sub-Saharan Africa in gen-
eral. In other words, how does Western law look when it comes
to Africa?
A. The Colonial Era
In general, in sub-Saharan Africa's Colonial era, we see al-
most no transfer of Western law to Europe's sub-Saharan African
subjects.46 Instead, we see Western law applied almost exclu-
sively to European colonists with some general European rules
imposed on parts of the urban African population.47 For exam-
ple, in litigations involving at least one European. Given that
most Africans lived outside urban areas, often because they were
not allowed to reside in colonial cities, the majority of the Afri-
can population used traditional law during the colonial period.48
Although customary court decisions were subject to colonial
control and traditional law was subject to "repugnancy" tests,4 9
45. See E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF THE PRIMITIVE MAN 5-17 (1st ed. 1954).
46. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN My FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF CULTURE 173-74 (1992); AVITrEY, AFRICA IN CHAOS, supra note 36, at 85-86; Sally
Falk Moore, Law: Customary Law, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
526, 529 (John Middleton ed., 1997).
47. See Falk Moore, supra note 46, at 526, 529; see also Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed
States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Nation, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903, 934-35 (1997).
48. See Falk Moore, supra note 46, at 527.
49. See id.
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Western law, like the Chinese Emperors, remained far away from
most native populations.
B. Post-Colonial Era
After independence, a different pattern emerged. In part
as a response to the drive for development, and in part as an
attempt to become modern States, African States began adopt-
ing Western laws and attempting to apply these laws to the gen-
eral population.5 ° However, this African movement toward
Western law often failed because of the problem of legal absorp-
tion, that is, State-created rules that exist on paper but which are
ignored in practice because the population continues to rely on
a rich traditional legal system.5"
IV. LEGAL ABSORPTION AND TAX LAW
The failure of Western law to take root in foreign soil has
mixed results. Sometimes the failure is not a great problem be-
cause other institutions fill the gap. For example, in bankruptcy
or in contract disputes, traditional rules and long-standing
course of dealings handle transactions outside Western law.5 2
Consider that ten years after the adoption of the Ethiopian Com-
mercial Code, John Beckstrom found that there was not one
bankruptcy filed in Addis Ababa, the capital city and the major
trading and legal center for all of Ethiopia. 5 Yet, this failure was
not problematic because traders continued to use traditional
methods to handle firm failures.54
However, relying on other institutions is not an option in
taxation because, generally, there is no other institution to fill
the gap. This lack of alternative institutions results because-as
opposed to contract or bankruptcy law, where the people in-
volved are motivated to work things out in order to have contin-
50. See Gordon, Growing Constitutions, supra note 36, at 542, 550; Basil Davidson,
Nationalism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 270-71 (John Middle-
ton ed., 1997); Falk Moore, supra note 46, at 528-29; Hyden, supra note 29, at 429.
51. See B.O. NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 24-25 (1973);
Gordon, Growing Constitutions, supra note 36, at 542-43, 546-47; Falk Moore, supra note
46, at 528-29.
52. See Falk Moore, supra note 46, at 528-29.
53. See John H. Beckstrom, Transplantation of Legal Systems: An Early Report on the
Reception of Western Laws in Ethiopia, 21 AM. J. COMp. L. 557, 570 (1973) (citing Ross &
Zemarian Berhe report on doing business in Addis Ababa).
54. See id. at 573-74.
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uing relationships-in tax law, avoidance is often the only moti-
vation. The fact is that no one wants to pay taxes, and this atti-
tude makes tax administration and enforcement extremely
important. Applying a second thought experiment to illustrate
the point, how many of us would commit multiple murders if we
thought we could avoid punishment? In contrast, how many of
us would pay our taxes if we thought we could escape payment
and avoid punishment?15
True, there are alternatives to taxation just as there are al-
ternatives to bankruptcy. But alternatives to taxation are more
harmful to the central State than most other types of alternative
legal systems. For example, people sometimes pay tributes ei-
ther to local organizations, elders, mafias, or landlords who then
distribute governmental benefits such as distribution of grazing
rights. 56 However, these alternative institutions threaten the
central state from the bottom up by depriving the state of funds
and making it irrelevant besides.
V. AFRICAN TAX LAW
The history of taxation in Africa would not predict the Afri-
can tax systems we see today. In fact, for most of its history, Af-
rica had fairly efficient to very efficient tax systems. In other
words, Africa has both traditional and colonial models that
raised large revenues at low administrative costs. Yet today these
systems are neglected in favor of Western tax models that are less
successful.
A. Traditional Systems
Traditional taxation in sub-Saharan Africa mirrors tradi-
tional taxation in the rest of the world. Thus, "in-kind" taxation
was the dominant African model, which is no surprise given that
"in-kind" taxation was the primary mode of taxation throughout
most of human history. For example, the Old Testament story of
Ruth and Naomi illustrates a type of "in-kind" taxation." "In-
55. See Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy, 1994 BYU L. REV. 521, 548-67
(1994).
56. See PERHAM, supra note 4, at 191, 193; see also PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 504-05.
57. Naomi and Ruth returned to Bethlehem at the beginning of the barley harvest.
For food, Ruth was allowed to gather the grain left behind by the reapers. See Ruth 1:22-
2:23.
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kind" taxation existed in Japan into the late 19th century.58 In
contemporary Europe we see "in-kind" taxation in the form of
required national service. In the Eritrean context we see "in-
kind" herd taxes as late as the Haile Selassie regime. 5' Today,
some oil producing countries continue to collect taxes "in
kind."'6
Without an established monetary system, most tax collection
must be "in kind."61 Pre-colonial African tax systems, like other
pre-modern tax systems, addressed the challenge of no common
monetary source by diversifying payment type. Based on what
each region produced, the collector might demand cotton,
cloth, ivory, gold, crops, or domestic animals.62 Often, these
taxes supported great Empires not only in Abyssinia but in West-
ern and Southern Africa as well. 63
B. Taxation in Eritrea before Italian Colonization
Richard Pankhurst is the main source on historical tax sys-
tems in Ethiopia. Pankhurst identifies thirteen items subject to
tax in Tigray (the Ethiopian province now partially included in
modern Eritrea).64 These taxes were almost exclusively paid "in
58. The late 19th century saw the imposition of cash payment of taxes in Japan.
Before that, the Japanese economy was a subsistence economy. See Harry T. Oshima,
Meiji Fiscal Policy and Agricultural Progress, in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE IN
JAPAN 353, 362-63 (William W. Lockwood ed., 1965); see also WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN: GROwTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 9, 521
(1968). However, "in-kind" agricultural taxes were collected in Japan immediately after
World War II. See RICHARD GOODE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 75-
76 (1984).
59. See PANRHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 504-10.
60. See GOODE, supra note 58, at 75-76.
61. See PERHAM, supra note 4, at 190.
62. See id. at 191-92.
63. See PANRHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 514-20.
64. These taxes were:
Fasas - a tax on grain measured by the number of oxen owned;
Hudad - a tax paid in money in lieu of harvesting and cultivating state lands;
Mar - a tax paid in honey;
Asrat - one tenth of harvested crops;
Frida - tax paid in cattle;
A tax paid on grain measured by the amount collected by tax collectors and
paid to the collector;
A tax paid in livestock or honey on feast days;
Banquets for visiting officials;
A tax consisting of beer, meat and bread on feast days;
The contribution of labor for building;
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kind" or "in labor."65 For example, Tigray farmers were obli-
gated to give labor in the form of ploughing, harvesting, and
sowing seeds.66
Because amounts were not consistent, it is difficult to say
what was paid in any particular period.67 Pankhurst reports a ten
percent harvest tax in the 1830s and a tax of one cow in the dry
season and half of all sterile cattle. 68 Sometimes serfs were re-
quired to give butter based on the number of sheep and goats
herded.69 In western Eritrea, serfs were required to give the
tongue of all cattle slaughtered for weddings and funerals and
the breast and fillet of all cattle slaughtered for other reasons.70
The pre-colonial tax systems were part of a wealth redistri-
bution network in which the central government, provincial rul-
ers and nobles, government workers, and clergymen lived off the
flow of tribute up from the peasant and merchant classes and
down again to the poor.7 The taxes were set from above by one
level of ruler over another until the obligation rested at the vil-
lage level with the chiqa shum ("local chief") who was required to
meet the quota set by his lord.7 2
The Abyssinian political system allowed for a series of tax
collections. Village chiefs were the actual collectors of agricul-
tural taxes of crops and animals.73 The Eritrean Rural Agricul-
tural Income Tax, which is designed to be collected and admin-
istered on the local level, reflects this system today. 4 Merchants,
who paid the required sum in advance, generally collected the
non-agricultural taxes based on local practice.75 Taxation was
A tax on livestock;
A cash tax on weaving;
A tax for the telephonist, if there was one, paid in grain.
See id. at 514.
65. See id. at 504; see also PERHAM, supra note 4, at 190.
66. See PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, Supra note 4, at 511.
67. See id. at 504-05.
68. See id. at 506-08.
69. See id. at 508.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 504; see also PERHAM, supra note 4, at 191-93.
72. See PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 505, 533.
73. See id. at 504-08.
74. See Legal Notice No. 20/1995 Income Tax Regulations, Legal Notice No. 21/1995
Rural Agriculture Income Tax and Cattle Tax Regulations, in GAZETTE OF ERITREAN LAwS,
Vol. 5/1995 No. 5, July 20, 1995 (Eritrea).
75. See PANKHURSr, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 519-20, 524-
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fairly arbitrary because it had no regularly set season or rate. 6
Often, taxation was burdensome.
77
Local governors collected taxes at territorial borders.7 8 In
Tigray, the fee was paid in pepper, cloth, and glass.7" These cus-
tom charges were imposed as frequently as every twenty miles.8 0
Thus, from Massawa to Addis Ababa, a merchant could pay cus-
toms as many as twenty times.8 ' These internal trade taxes were
large revenue producers and consequently difficult to reform. 2
Even pressure from France, England, and Italy did not produce
significant modification. 3
Import and export duties over foreign borders were slower
to materialize. 4 They were most successful in Massawa where
Turks, Egyptians, and the Naib collected port duties, head taxes
on slaves and traders, and duties on imports, exports, and for-
eign travelers.8 5 Ras Kassa, who later became Emperor Yohan-
nes, also instituted a tax on looms.8 6 Market taxes on purchased
goods were charged in the larger trading centers.8 7
The amount each king raised varied from region to region
and is difficult to express in dollars given how much was col-
lected "in kind.8 8 However, certain kings, including the Naib of
Arkiko and Emperor Yohannes did well under any measure.89
C. Sub-Saharan African Colonial Taxation in General
In general, colonial tax systems were some of the most
clever ever devised. Because the only point of these tax systems
was to raise revenues as cheaply as possible, colonial tax systems
76. These chiqa shum retained their positions through many administrations and so
presented a level of consistency to average people even when there were massive shifts
in the upper echelons of power. See id. at 504-05.
77. See id. at 504-06.
78. See id. at 521.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 522-23.
81. See id. at 522.
82. See id. at 524-26.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 527-29.
85. See id. at 529-31.
86. See id. at 510.
87. See id. at 520.
88. See id. at 505, 533-40.
89. See id. at 536.
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were simple, efficient, and ruthless in their ability to raise reve-
nues at little or no economic or political cost.
The classic Colonial African tax was the schedular system
used by the French and the Belgians.9 ° In a schedular system,
the government identifies two or three types of easily collected
income groups-for example, government employee salaries
and rents received from urban housing-and taxes only those
items.9 Thus, many of the concepts that we expect in a Western
tax system drop out of schedular tax systems. For example, the
fairness of horizontal equity (people with equal incomes paying
equal amounts of tax) is absent from a schedular system.92
Further, in a schedular system, each income type is taxed
differently based on the government's view of that item's tax
avoidance potential. As a result, government employees might
face a ten percent rate because they cannot lie about the amount
of their government salary, while business people might face a
fifty percent rate because of their ability to hide income.93
In contrast to the French and Belgians, the English claimed
to follow a unitary (global) pattern in their African colonial tax
systems, although this claim may have been more rhetorical than
real.94 A unitary tax system claims to reach all types of income.95
Yet, we know that the Hut tax imposed by the English in Kenya,
subjecting only one type of property to tax, had more in com-
mon with schedular taxes than global taxes.9 6
90. See Richard Goode, Implementing Tax Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa, in AFRICA
BUREAU OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TAX POLICY
FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 17 (USAID Doc. No. PN-ABE-524,
Oct. 29-30, 1987).
91. See id. ("In a pure schedular system, each of the principal income flows-sala-
ties and wages, earnings from professional activities, business profits, dividends and in-
terest, rent-is subject to a separate, flat-rate schedular tax, and rates differ among the
schedules.").
92. See id. at 5.
93. See RICHARD M. BIRD, TAX POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 11 (1992);
Goode, supra note 90, at 18. These differential rates are somewhat similar to American
tax rules on certain business deductions such as the 50% limit on meals under I.R.C.
§ 274. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 274 (1997).
94. See BIRD, supra note 93, at 88-89; Goode, supra note 90, at 17.
95. See Goode, supra note 90, at 19.
96. See MARJORIE RUTH DILLEY, BRITISH POLICY IN KENYA COLONY 239-47 (2d ed.
1966); see also JoMo KENYATTA, FACING MOUNT KENYA: THE TRADITIONAL LIFE OF THE
GIKUYU 77 (African Writer Series 1979) (stating that British Government imposed heavy
taxes on owners of huts).
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D. Taxation in Eritrea in the Colonial Era
The modern Eritrean tax system shifted away from the Ethi-
opian tax system at the beginning of Italian colonization.9" In
1898, the Italians abolished "in kind" taxes in favor of cash pay-
ments. 8 This created problems for peasants who had little ac-
cess to cash. 99
In the Italian colony of Eritrea, there were two major taxes:
tasse and imposte.100 These taxes were mostly imposed on Italian
colonialists. However, the taxes also applied to Eritreans who
stood in the same shoes as colonists, for example, Eritrean
merchants.1 01
The most important tax was a tassa on business, which cor-
responded to the Italian registry tax. 10 2 In many ways, the tassa
corresponds to the American understanding of a stamp tax be-
cause it was collected through the sale of special stamps. The
tassa applied to every kind of transaction (both civil and com-
mercial),10 3 and on inheritance. 104 The tassa on business opera-
tions was sometimes fixed and sometimes proportional. 10 5 The
Italian government also imposed tasse on mortgages, documents
drafted by a notary public, hunting licenses, trademarks, cars,
and the provision of health services."0 6
The main imposta was on real estate.' 0 7 It was paid accord-
ing to the estimated net income from the property.1 8 . Another
important imposta was on income. °9 This income tax was pro-
gressive." 0 It applied to people with a trade, professionals, re-
97. Italian occupation of Massawa began in 1885, and established as an Italian col-
ony in late 1889. See PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 19;
see also CASTELLANI, supra note 24, at 3.
98. See PANKHURST, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 4, at 510.
99. See id.
100. See ERNESTO CUCINOTIA, ISTITUZIONI DI DItrro COLONIALE ITALIANO § 286, at
365-66 (1930).
101. See id. § 287, at 367-68.
102. See id. at 367.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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tailers, and providers of goods in general.111 Public clerks were
initially exempted, but they were made subject to the tax after
1928.112
Italian colonial municipal governments had the right to levy
taxes on the municipal level independent of the Italian govern-
ment in Rome.' 13 These tasse were imposed on retail commerce
and commercial (but not traditional) slaughtering." 4
African Eritreans were subject to two special imposte. First,
all local populations were forced to pay a "tribute on indigenous
populations," which was fixed yearly by a royal decree according
to the political and economic condition of the people following
the advice of the Superior Colonial Council and the Ministries
Council.115 This tribute was levied according to local custom
with the help of local chiefs.
16
The second imposta dealt with the use of State lands.117 Be-
cause the State owned these lands, they were not directly subject
to tax. 18 Nevertheless, the use of the lands by local people fol-
lowing traditional customs was taxed.11 9
E. Modern African Tax Systems
Post-colonial tax systems follow the pattern of other African
legal systems. Just as in other legal matters, the newly indepen-
dent African nations tended to reject traditional law and adopt
Western law in its place.
Today most African countries have a number of different
taxes including:
1. Import and export taxes-usually producing about
twenty-five to fifty percent of tax revenues for the period
between 1992 to 1998;120
111. See id. § 287, at 367-68.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 368.
114. See id.
115. This iniposta was called "tributo sulle popolazioni indigene." See id. § 288, at
368.
116. See id. at 369.
117. See id. at 368. This imposta was called "imposta fondiaria." See id.
118. See id. at 369.
119. See id.
120. Current and complete data on tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa is difficult to
locate. The most complete data for the region is from 1985. See WORLD BANK, LESSONS
OF TAX REFORM 16 (1991) [hereinafter LESSONS OF TAX REFORM]. More current data is
2001] HOMOGENIZED LAW
2. Sales and excise taxes-usually producing about fifteen
to thirty percent of tax revenues for the period between
1992 to 1998;121
3. Income taxes-which are, in reality, almost always com-
pany and wage taxes given the difficulty of identifying
other income sources, 122 producing about ten percent of
tax revenues for the period between 1992 and 1998;123
4. Stamp taxes; 1 24
5. Wealth taxes (generally property and agricultural
taxes)-which produce very little revenue.1 21
reported for various time periods. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GOVERNMENT
FINANCE STATISTICS YEARBOOK 4, 186, 246, 376, 434 (1999). Tables I and 2 present data
on tax revenue. For the countries listed in Table 2, import and export tax revenue
averaged 33.55% of total revenue over the 1992 to 1998 period. Guinea reported the
highest percent of total revenue 75.14% (1998), while South Africa reported the lowest
import and export tax revenue, .26% (1997) of total revenue. Id. at 186, 376.
121. For the countries listed in Table 2, general sales tax and value added tax
("VAT") revenue averaged 13.10% of total tax revenues over the 1992 to 1998 period.
See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 120, at 4, 186, 246, 376, 434. Excise tax
revenue averaged 9.39% of total revenue for the same period. See id. at 22, 68, 82, 85,
89, 107, 109, 114, 150, 165, 175, 186, 228, 246, 259, 270, 283, 288, 353, 364, 366, 376,
408, 434, 437. General sales and VAT tax revenue varied from a high of 31.61% of total
revenue in the Gambia (1993) to a low of 2.34% of total revenue in Republic of Congo
(1997). See id. at 4. Excise tax revenue was the greatest in Burundi (1997) at 28.44% of
total tax revenue and was .05% of total tax revenue for the Gambia (1993). See id. at 85,
165.
122. See LESSONS OF TAx REFORM, supra note 120, at 15-16.
123. For the countries listed in Table 2, individual tax revenue averaged 9.80% of
total tax revenue over the 1992 to 1998 period. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
supra note 120, at 4, 186, 246, 376, 434. Corporate tax revenue averaged 8.82% over
the 1992 to 1998 period. See id. Individual tax revenue was the highest in South Africa
(1997) at 38.97% and Zimbabwe (1997) at 30.02% of total tax revenue. Individual tax
revenue was the lowest in Seychelles (1998) at .01% of total revenue. See id. Corporate
tax revenue was the highest in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997) at 15.34% of
total tax revenue and the lowest in Republic of Congo (1997) at .18% of total tax reve-
nue. See id.
124. Stamp taxes are included in Tables 1 and 2 as part of the other tax category.
See LESSONS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 120, at 16.
125. For countries listed in Table 2, "-" indicates data for which the figure is zero
or less than half of a significant digit and "...." indicates data that is not available.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 120, at x. Table 2 indicates that property
tax revenue averaged .84% of total tax revenue over the 1992 to 1998 period.
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1. Problems of Administration
Creating administrable laws is extremely important in the
tax area because no country can expect an alternative system to
come in and save the day. Yet, African countries generally lack
administrative capacity.126 Thus, a logical tax structure in sub-
Saharan Africa would be to tax as few people as possible, while
raising as much revenue as possible, so that a minimal degree of
administrative capacity would be involved in collecting revenue
from 1,000 people rather than a large amount of capacity ex-
pended collecting revenue from 500,000 people. Further, the
most efficient tax systems in the colonial and pre-colonial peri-
ods usually covered a limited geographic area that was easily con-
trolled. Thus, port taxes, transit taxes, and internal customs
were popular in pre-colonial Ethiopian tax systems and are ma-
jor revenue generators today.12 7
2. Problems of Revenue
Given the revenue sources that each tax system provides, we
would expect sub-Saharan African governments to spend most of
their legal resources on import and export duties.12 1 Yet, in
most countries, the vast majority of administrative resources are
expended on income taxes and value added taxes ("VATs"). 29
Not surprisingly, income taxes and VATs are the most popular
taxes in OECD countries. 13 0
Income taxes and VATs are also the taxes most likely to have
problems with legal absorption because they are new to Africa,
complicated, and hard to apply.13' If legal absorption is so im-
126. See LESSONS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 120, at 26-27.
127. See supra Table 2.
128. See U.N. DEP'T FOR DEV. SUPPORT & MGMT, GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING TAX
ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19 (1997) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS]
(stating that import-export taxes are easy to administer and "relatively difficult to
elude"). On the other hand, income taxes may be difficult to administer due to com-
plex laws and procedures. See id. at 19-20; LESSONS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 120, at
26-27.
129. A VAT is a complicated consumption tax system. For a detailed discussion of
VATs, see JAMES M. BIcKLEY, VALUE-ADDED TAX: CONCEPTS, POLICY ISSUES, AND OECD
EXPERIENCES 1-5 (1995), microformed on Major Studies and Issues Briefs of the Congres-
sional Research Service 95-500-E (Univ. Publications of Am.); see also LESSONS OF TAX
REFORM, supra note 120, at 31-33.
130. See BICKLEY, supra note 129, at 5-6; VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING
WORLD 45-46 (1995).
131. See LESSONS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 120, at 51.
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portant in tax law, why are Western tax laws like the VAT and the
income tax adopted by so many sub-Saharan States? Further,
why do most sub-Saharan African tax systems, as written, attempt
to tax as many people as possible over a wide territory, instead of
taxing a few people over a limited territory? By using income
taxes on individuals and consumption taxes that go down to the
retail level, 132 African tax systems take up administrative re-
sources without producing the revenues associated with import
taxes, customs, and duties that tax a few people in limited and
easily controlled areas. 133
VI. TAXATION IN ERITREA
Since independence, Eritrea has adopted a number of taxes
many of which are very similar to taxes employed in Ethiopia.13 1
Some of these taxes are generally enforced, some are enforced
only in limited areas or among specific populations, and some
exist only on the books, with no enforcement at all. The most
generally enforced taxes are the import duties and customs.13 5
This is hardly surprising given that goods must come in from
relatively limited and easily controlled ports and border cross-
ings, and that import duties are most likely to produce hard cur-
rency.
The taxes that are not presently enforced are the Agricul-
tural Income Tax (which is actually a wealth tax on land and
domestic animals), the Petroleum Extraction Tax, and the Min-
ing Tax. If they were enforced, the Petroleum and Mining Taxes
might adversely affect the environment because of the tax incen-
tives they provide for environmentally harmful activities.
132. See Seth E. Terkper, African Development Bank Workshop on Tax Reforms in Africa,
50 BULL. INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 120, 120-24 (1996).
133. From 1986 to 1992, income tax and VATs contributed only 17.7% of the total
tax revenues in African countries, compared with 30.4% of the OECD countries. On
the other hand, for the same time period, import and export duties contributed 35% of
total tax revenues for African countries, compared with less than 1% for O.E.C.D. coun-
tries. See id. at 121.
134. Eritrea uses customs and duties (Proc. 64/1994), an income tax (Proc. 62/
1994), a stamp tax (Proc. 65/1994), a sales and excise tax (Proc. 64/1994), a rural
agricultural tax (Proc. 63/1994), a petroleum tax and a mining tax (Proc. 40/1993 and
41/1993) and an income tax on Eritreans working abroad (Proc. 67/1995). See gener-
ally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF STAFF COUNTRY REPORT No. 98/91, ERITREA:
SELECTED ISSUES 28-34 (1998).
135. Since October 5, 1994, Eritrea has exempted locally manufactured goods
from export duties. See id. at 34.
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In Eritrea, the most time and administrative attention is
given to the Income Tax. In terms of impact, eighty percent of
Eritreans are herders or small farmers who are not covered by
this tax. 36 Further, many urban dwellers avoid the tax. This in-
cludes even very obvious candidates for the tax, such as foreign
professors at the University of Asmara and domestic workers.
There are no publicly available figures on how much reve-
nue the Eritrean Income Tax produces, but I was told by govern-
ment officials that ninety percent of Department of Inland Reve-
nue time is spent on populations that produce ten percent of
the income tax revenue. Although income taxes are difficult to
administer, Eritrea is attempting to enforce that tax. Enforce-
ment is not going well and revenues are uneven. As a result, the
Eritrean system is moving towards presumptive taxation. 37
VII. EXPLANATIONS FOR ADOPTION OF WESTERN TAX LAW
There are at least three possible explanations for the adop-
tion of income taxes and VATs (as well as other Western style
taxes) by sub-Saharan States over "in-kind" taxes, other tradi-
tional taxes and even Colonial taxes. These three reasons are:
(1) pressures from the global economy;1 s
(2) pressure from experts; 139 and,
(3) lack of knowledge.
A. Pressures of Global Trade
One explanation for the adoption of Western tax laws is
outside pressure in the form of trade agreements and treaties. 4 °
The last twenty years have seen an international push towards
the flow of goods across borders.11 This trend towards a global
economy puts pressure on African States to eliminate import
136. See id. at 31.
137. Presumptive taxation occurs when a tax is computed based on gross estimates
of revenues usually formed by observations of entire industries rather than on an indi-
vidual company's actual records. See GONTHER TAUBE & HELAWAY TADESSE, PRESUMPrlvE
TAXATION IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA: EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS 1-3 (International Mon-
etary Fund Working Paper No. WP/96/5, 1996).
138. See TANZI, supra note 130, at 42-47.
139. See LESSONS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 120, at 8; Terkper, supra note 132, at
121.
140. See TANzi, supra note 130, at 4244.
141. See id.
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and export taxes. 14 2
The problem for most African States is that they collect
twenty-five to fifty percent of their tax revenue from import and
export taxes.14 3 Because of this dependence, there are waivers
within the major trade agreements that allow African States to
keep at least some of their customs and duties.'4 4 But even with
waivers, international trade treaties convey a message to African
policy makers that import and export taxes are old-fashioned
and pathetic, as if true economic development cannot coexist
with customs and tariffs. The truth is that most modern indus-
trial states achieved the largest part of their economic develop-
ment in the age of customs and tariffs. 1
45
Further, this attack on the most productive source of tax
revenues can only result in a decline in tax revenues. An inabil-
ity to raise tax revenues forces African countries to rely on other
sources of public finance, such as the sale of natural resources,
foreign aid, and foreign debt, all of which are problematic.
146
B. Pressures from Outside Experts
The second outside force that might explain the African
move towards Western tax systems is the pressure of experts
from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"),
and other international agencies who advise developing coun-
tries on their tax codes. These experts come from OECD coun-
tries that are not dependent on trade taxes, and instead rely on
income taxes on individuals or companies and VATs for a large
percent of their tax revenue. Accordingly, what these experts
understand and attempt to recreate are these same tax systems
142. See id. In most industrial countries, import and export duties generate insig-
nificant amounts of revenue. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 120, at 4.
143. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 120, at 4; see also LESSONS OF
TAX REFORM, supra note 120, at 16-17; TANZI, supra note 130, at 43.
144. See CHRISTOPHER S. ADAM & STEPHEN A. O'CONNELL, AID, TAXATION, AND DE-
VELOPMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AID EFFECTIVENESS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 6
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1885, 1998); RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN A NUTSHELL 115-16 (1996); UNCTAD, THE
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1998 REPORT 71-72 (1998); WORLD BANK, SUB-SAH-ARAN
AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 61 (1989).
145. See TANZI, supra note 130, at 42-44.
146. See Terkper, supra note 132, at 120. Some believe that the reduction in tax
revenues, especially trade taxes, should be weighed against the benefits of trade liberali-
zation. See Dean A. DeRosa, Protection and Export Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 128
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 88, 119-20 (1992).
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in Africa.147
In the 1960s and 1970s, income tax systems were popular
with Western tax advisors who were interested in progressively
broadening the tax base. 4 8 In the 1980s and 1990s, VATS were
popular with advisors because of the Western emphasis on con-
sumption taxes.14 9
C. Lack of Knowledge about More Efficient Systems
Is lack of knowledge a cause for the African emphasis on
Western tax law? The answer is an emphatic no.
What is interesting about Africa is how recently indepen-
dence came to the continent. 150 Because independence began
in the 1960s and continued into the 1990s, many African tax ad-
ministrators actually lived and worked under Colonial regimes.
These Colonial regimes used the type of tax systems that raise
the most revenue with the smallest administrative effort.
15
'
Thus, African tax administrators know more about efficient tax
systems than the experts they rely on. Lack of knowledge is not
the problem.
But, if lack of knowledge is not the answer, can we return to
outside pressure as the explanation for Western tax law in sub-
Saharan Africa?
VIII. WHY ERITREA SHOULD BE ABLE TO AVOID THE
PROBLEMS FACED BY OTHER SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICAN STATES
Up to now you might conclude that my opinion is that the
sub-Saharan African move towards inefficient tax systems results
from outside pressure. But in Eritrea, that is not the case.
147. See LESSONS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 120, at 8.
148. See Vito Tanzi & Joseph Aschheim, Why Tax Corporations?, in 4 READINGS ON
TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 227-32 (Richard M. Bird & Oliver Oldman eds.,
1990) (describing policy shift from income to consumption taxes); LESSONS OF TAX
REFORM, supra note 120, at 24; UNITED NATIONS, supra note 128, at 10; Terkper, supra
note 132, at 121.
149. See READINGS ON TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 148, at 227;
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 128, at 10. Today, all European and American countries
except the United States have the VAT. In the 1960s, only nine countries had the tax
and by 1994, ninety countries had the VAT. See TANZI, supra note 130, at 45-46.
150. See HODD, supra note 30, at 34.
151. See id. at 34, 35. For general discussion, see LESSONS OF TAX REFORM, supra
note 120, at 51-54; Goode, supra note 90, at 17-18.
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Eritreans pride themselves on not being subject to outside
pressure. This comes from the fact that the political leadership
spent thirty years in the desert fighting for independence.
5 2
The result was minimal contact with the outside world and a feel-
ing that Eritrea does not need the outside world. Further, the
Eritrean government is very outspoken about its ability to learn
from mistakes of other African nations. It has banned most non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") because it believes that
NGOs undermine other African States. 15 3 It only recently al-
lowed the Internet, and media is censored in accordance with
the Press Proclamation. 154 Further, the general population has
little access to electricity much less radios or televisions that
might bring in foreign ideas.'55 The combination of these fac-
tors should mean that Eritreans, at least, would avoid OECD
style tax systems in favor of more efficient methods. But that is
not the case.
Why has Eritrea fallen into the same problems of Western
transplants that plague the rest of Africa?
Why would people with:
* knowledge of older systems that worked,
* knowledge of the thirty years of problems other African
States experienced with their Western style tax systems,
* a well-known antipathy towards foreign ideas and advi-
sors, and,
* an isolation which might protect them from outside influ-
ence,
make the same decisions and fall into the same problems as
other African states without these advantages?
I believe that, in some sense, these laws operate symboli-
152. See CASTELLANI, supra note 24, at 1.
153. See Bureau for Africa, United States Agency for International Development,
Eritrea: Population, Health, and Nutrition Briefing Sheet 2 (1998); Jeffrey Goldberg,
Our African Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1997, § 6, at 34.
154. See Awate Research Unit, Halloween Scare: Eritrean Press Proclamation, available
at http://www.awate.com/documents/pressproclamation.htm (last modified Oct. 16,
2000); Carol Pineau, Eritrean Press Gains Momentum from Conflict, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE,
Oct. 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 25118279.
155. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, STAFF COUNTRY REPORT No. 96/66, ERI-
TREA: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 3 (1996) ("Approximately 80% of Eritrea's
population is rural, and the urban dwellers are concentrated in the country's capital
Asmara").
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cally. That is, their purpose is not to be enforced and thereby
produce revenues or protect copyrights. Rather, they serve as a
way of signaling both to insiders and outsiders that a nation State
is formed and functioning.
This need to signal statehood, informs at least some of the
law reform occurring in Eritrea today. What is interesting about
Eritrea is how this concept might have penetrated into the na-
tional consciousness. In other African nations we may claim that
concepts of the nation State travel through a type of "colored"
class.' 5 6 This is not a mixed race class in terms of blood, but in
terms of experience. In other words, many African countries get
their Western ideas from native people who have foreign train-
ing or experience.' 7 What is fascinating about Eritrea is that we
see the same emphasis on the nation State without as many gov-
ernment people with Western training or experience. What this
says to me is that the concept of modernity has become so strong
in sub-Saharan Africa that it can penetrate into countries in ways
that are more subtle and pervasive than previously suspected.
IX. WHY CONCEPTS OF A NATION STATE MAKE A
DIFFERENCE HERE
What I have described here is a process of legal homogeni-
zation. Through a variety of mechanisms-in this case, I argue,
the concept of the nation State-African tax laws are meant to
look more and more like Western tax laws. Because law must
harmonize with indigenous political, economic, and administra-
tive systems, homogenization fails. Laws are not administered.
Revenues are not collected.
What has this to do with the United States? Are we bystand-
ers merely witnessing the train wreck? Are we part of the prob-
lem? Through our own international agencies and our influ-
ence over the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank, through
our exportation of American culture, do we help create the at-
mosphere that encourages this attempted homogenization? Cer-
tainly. But what is perhaps more important for us is that, in the
end, our own tax systems are also under pressure to homogenize
and we may have to face our own legal absorption problem soon.
In the tax area we see this creeping homogenization in the
156. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN 246-48 (1992).
157. See id.
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many academic articles favoring consumption taxes. 158 These
are the same taxes that are most in vogue in Western Europe
and Asia. They are the same taxes encouraged for Africa. They
are not necessarily the taxes best suited for American culture or
politics. Thus, adoption of these types of taxes could result in an
American legal absorption problem.
In the trade area, we see the move toward homogenization
in the controversies surrounding the World Trade Organization
("WTO"). Much more than in the tax area, the public has re-
sponded to the attempt to use trade to shape our internal laws.
Yet, although trade is a powerful force and the WTO has great
influence, it is not the only force or body driving the United
States to look like everywhere else. For now, we see ourselves in
control; we see other countries trying to (or being forced to)
look like us. Soon, we may find the tables turned and, by then, it
might be too late.
158. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption Type or Cash-Flow Personal Income
Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974);Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and
Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEo L.J. 539, 565-68 (1998); Charles E.
McLure, Jr., The U.S. Debate on Consumption-Based Taxes: Implications for the Americas, 29
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 143 (1998); Peggy B. Musgrove, Consumption Tax Proposals in
International Settings, 54 TAX L. REV. 77 (2000); John K McNulty, Hat Tax Consumption
Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of
Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2095 (2000); Alvin C. Warren, Would a Con-
sumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax? 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980); Laurence J. Kot-
lidoff, Consumption Taxation-The A,B,C's That Evey Politician Should Know, 48 EMORY
L.J. 823 (1999).
